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ENVIRONMENTAL ENLARGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: APPROXIMATION OF THE ACQUIS
COMMUNAUTAIRE AND THE CHALLENGES THAT IT
PRESENTS FOR THE APPLICANT COUNTRIES
By Patrick J. Kapios

T

he European Union (“EU” or “Union”) has begun the
process of enlarging its membership. Currently, ten
countries located in Central and Eastern Europe are
under consideration for membership in the Union, in addition
to Cyprus, Malta and Turkey. One of the requirements for
accession to the European Union is that the applicant countries1
approximate their legislation to that of the acquis communautaire.
The acquis contains the laws and regulations of the EU. One
section of the acquis contains EU laws and regulations
concerning the environment. Approximation of this section
of the acquis by the applicant countries will not be an easy task.
They face difficulties ranging from a lack of the necessary
financial resources to an administrative structure that is not
prepared to implement and enforce the EU legislation.
Successful approximation, however, is necessary in order for
accession to occur.
This Paper will discuss the challenges facing the
applicant countries in approximating the European Union’s
environmental acquis. Part II will discuss some of the EU’s
environmental legislation and the Treaty provisions that are
used by the Union to enact environmental legislation. An
overview of the enlargement process will be given in Part III.
Finally, Part IV of the Paper will discuss the process of
approximation and the challenges that it provides the applicant
countries. A discussion of the financial resources available to
the applicant countries will also be included in this section.
ENVIRONMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Initially, the European Union did not regulate the
environment of its member states. A common environmental
policy was not provided for in the Treaty of Rome.2 Over
time, however, the EU recognized the need to have a common
environmental policy. Since environmental protection became
a priority of the EU in the early 1970’s, over 400 pieces of
environmental legislation, primarily in the form of directives,
have been adopted.3 In fact, over half of all environmental
legislation that member states are subject to has been the result
of actions taken by the European Union.4 The European Union
has passed legislation in a wide range of environmental
disciplines, including air quality, water, and waste.5 The Union’s
environmental legislation has developed in line with the three
main beliefs it has relating to the environment: that prevention
is better than a cure, that the polluter should pay, and that
pollution should be rectified at the source.6 Environmental
protection must be taken into account in any new policy that is
considered by the Union. The result is that EU member states
have some of the strictest environmental standards in the world.7
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The majority of European Union environmental
legislation occurs in the form of directives and regulations.
Directives establish the policy that the EU wants to take. The
requirements of a directive are binding on the member states,
but it provides the member states with discretion on the methods
used to achieve the policy.8 A regulation does not allow the
member states discretion in how to implement it. Regulations
are used when it is necessary that all of the member states have
the same requirements. They become the law in the member
states from the date that they are to become effective –
transposition into national law is not required.9
Legislation within the European Union follows the
principle of subsidiarity. Consequently, the EU can legislate
only in areas where action at the Union level would serve to
better achieve the desired results than would action at the
national level.10 Any policy areas that are better addressed at
the national level must be left to the discretion of the national
governments. This principle applies to areas, such as the
environment, where the Union does not have exclusive powers.11
Environmental policies are enacted by the European
Union based on either Article 100a or Articles 130(r-t). It is
up to the Commission to determine which of these articles
serves as the appropriate mechanism for enacting environmental
legislation.12 Article 100a of the EC Treaty allows the Union
to enact environmental laws in areas that “affect the
establishment or functioning of the common market.”13
Legislation enacted under this provision is intended to prevent
against unfair competition and remove barriers to trade
throughout the Union. An individual member state may apply
stricter environmental standards only with the approval of the
Commission and after demonstrating why stronger measures
are necessary.14
Articles 130(r-t) give the European Union the authority
to enact environmental legislation that does not directly affect
the common market.15 These provisions apply to policy areas
that are better developed at the Community level. Article 130r
lists the principles of Union environmental policy. The
legislative procedure to be followed in enacting environmental
legislation is listed in article 130s. Finally, article 130t allows
individual member states to adopt stricter standards for policies
enacted under section 130s.16 This is a broader section than
article 100a. It allows for the implementation of stricter
standards provided that they do not arbitrarily discriminate and
do not serve as a trade restriction. Under Article 100a the
Commission must only be notified – its approval is not
required.17
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ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS
Enlargement is the process of adding new member
states to the European Union. Since its inception as the
European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, the European
Union has undergone enlargement four times. The most recent
enlargement occurred in 1995 with the accession of Austria,
Finland, and Sweden. Enlargement in the European Union
occurs based on Article O of the Treaty of the European
Union.18
Article O establishes the procedures to be followed in
the application process, as well as setting out the requirements
for which countries are eligible for European Union
membership.19 Any country that is considered to be within
Europe can be considered for membership in the Union.20
The application process begins by filing a formal
application with the Council of Ministers. The Council then
decides to either reject the application or request an opinion
about the applicant from the Commission.21 Depending on
the outcome of the Commission’s opinion, negotiations may
be commenced with the applicant country. The terms of the
applicant country’s accession to the Union are determined
through the negotiations.22 Once negotiations have been
initiated, the length of time before accession occurs varies
depending upon the nature of issues that must be resolved
between the applicant and the Union.23 After an agreement
has been reached with the applicant, the agreement is submitted
to all member states for ratification in accordance with the
requirements of their national constitutions. Ratification by
the member states must be unanimous for an applicant country
to be approved for accession.24
ENLARGEMENT TO THE EAST
The European Union is comprised of nations mainly
from Western Europe. Recently, the European Union began
the process of enlarging to countries located in Central and
Eastern Europe. The possible enlargement to include countries
from this region has been referred to as a “historic
opportunity.” 25 It is also viewed as the most challenging
enlargement that has been undertaken by the Union in its history.
Enlargement to the countries currently under consideration
would increase the EU’s population to roughly 500 million and
nearly double the number of member states in the
organization.26
The foundations for the current enlargement process
were established by the Copenhagen European Council that
was held in 1993. This Council meeting concluded that “[t]he
associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so
desire shall become members of the Union. Accession will
take placed as soon as a country is able to assume the obligations
of membership by satisfying the economic and political
conditions.”27 Thus, the basis for further expansion of the
European Union was created. The Council also established
the “Copenhagen Criteria” – the basic conditions that applicant
countries must fulfill in order to join the Union. The
Copenhagen Criteria consist of three requirements. The first
is that the applicant must have stable institutions that guarantee
democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Second, the
applicant must have a functioning market economy. Finally,
SPRING / SUMMER 2002

the applicant must have an infrastructure that is capable of
implementing and enforcing European Union law.28
Thirteen countries have applied for accession to the
European Union.29 Since March 1998, the accession process
has begun for all of the applicant countries. However, due to
the length of time necessary to meet the requirements for
accession, it is not anticipated that any of the applicant countries
will be ready for membership until 2002 at the earliest.30
One requirement for accession is that the applicant
countries align their national legislation with the legislation that
is currently in force within the European Union.31 This is a
difficult process because the existing legislation in many of
the applicant countries is vastly different from European Union
legislation. 32 Applicant countries must approximate their
national laws in all areas covered by the acquis communautaire.
Unfortunately, many applicants view the approximation process
only in relation to economic issues, seeing accession as a
guarantee of economic success.33 However, this would be a
mistake. Approximation must occur in all areas of the acquis in
order for the applicant countries to be admitted to the Union.
The environmental portion of European Union
legislation is one area that the applicant countries should not
ignore. Environmental conditions in the applicant countries
are considered to be “abysmally low,” especially when compared
with legislation within the EU.34 Standards between the
applicants and the EU vary widely, and EU regulation of the
environment covers a wider scope of issues.35 Failure by the
applicant countries to properly approximate their environmental
legislation, by focusing instead only on economic issues, may
prevent a country from membership in the Union.36 Because
of this possibility, it is important that the applicant countries
focus attention on approximating the Union’s environmental
measures. Attention is especially needed in meeting the Union’s
environmental requirements relating to drinking water,
wastewater, solid waste management, and air quality.37
ENLARGEMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT
THE EFTAN ENLARGEMENT
The environment has played a significant role in
accession negotiations of past enlargements, especially the 1995
enlargement to the EFTA countries of Austria, Finland and
Sweden. However, the environmental situation faced by these
three countries was vastly different from the situation currently
faced by the applicant countries. The EFTA countries generally
had what were considered to be high environmental standards,
in many cases more stringent than what was required by the
European Union.38 These countries sought to maintain their
strict environmental standards upon their accession to the EU,
despite the fact that the standards could influence the
functioning of the common market.39 The result was that a
compromise had to be achieved between the applicants and
the member states. The compromise allowed the EFTA
countries to maintain their stricter standards for four years.40
During that time period, the EFTA countries would work to
increase the environmental standards of the Union. The EFTA
countries would attempt to bring the environmental standards
of the Union up to the level that was in force within the EFTA
countries.41 At the end of the four years, common standards
would be in force for all of the Union’s members.
5

THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE
Applicant countries seeking membership in the
European Union must adopt the acquis communautaire (“acquis”).
The acquis consists of the laws of the EU. It is roughly 80,000
pages of laws and regulations that applicant countries must
approximate into their national legislation.42 It includes
directives, regulations, and decisions adopted on the basis of
the EU’s treaties.43 The acquis has been divided into thirty-one
different chapters, corresponding to different areas of Union
policy. One of the chapters of the acquis is devoted to the
Union’s environmental rules and regulations.44 Adoption of
the entire acquis is a prerequisite for Union membership.
The environmental acquis has been developing since
the 1970’s, when environmental issues became a focus of Union
policy. Since that time, the European Union has enacted
approximately 400 pieces of environmental legislation.
However, the environmental acquis only consists of about ninetyone pieces of the EU legislation – seventy directives and twentyone regulations.45
The challenge faced by the applicant countries is due
to the scope of the legislation that comprises the acquis. The
acquis is much more complex than in previous enlargements,
and the EU is insisting that the applicants have adopted the
entire acquis before accession occurs.46 This is despite the fact
that no new member state has ever adopted the entire acquis
before joining the Union.47 Typically, the EU allows the
applicants a transition period during which the new Member
State can continue to adopt the acquis.48
Applicant countries have already begun the process
of adopting the provisions contained in the acquis. Compliance
with the requirements of the acquis is an expensive process,
and the applicant countries have limited funding. Because of
this, it is important for the applicant countries to set priorities
to follow in their adoption process.49 The most significant
investment is needed in the areas of drinking water, waste
management and air quality.50 Priority should be focused in
these areas because they are also important for adopting other
EU legislation. However, in the long run, environmental
priorities must be country specific, because different areas have
different needs.51
STEPS IN THE APPROXIMATION PROCESS
Applicant countries must approximate their legislation
to resemble that of the European Union in all areas of the
acquis, including the environmental chapter. Approximation is
a difficult task that will require significant improvements and
capital investments within the applicant countries.52 The goal
of the approximation process is ensure 100 percent compliance
with the acquis “not just on paper, but . . . also in fact.”53 To
reinforce this requirement, the approximation process is typically
seen as consisting of three elements: adoption or transposition,
implementation, and enforcement.54 These three elements are
highly dependent upon each other, meaning that all of them
must be addressed for approximation to be successful.
1. Adoption/Transposition
The first element of the approximation process is
transposition. Transposition means that competent national
authorities take legislative, regulatory and administrative
measures in order to incorporate into national law the
6

obligations of the EU’s environmental directives, for the
environmental chapter of the acquis.55 The first step in the
transposition process is to compare existing national legislation
with the measures that the environmental acquis requires the
applicant countries to adopt. This will help the applicants to
identify gaps that need to be addressed during the approximation
process. 56 Next, the national authority responsible for
environmental approximation must determine the scope of
discretion that they have when transposing EU laws into their
national legislation. The responsibility for correctly transposing
the environmental measures of the EU falls to the national
governments, and in particular on the environmental ministry.57
After determining where legislation is required and the
discretion that they have to transpose the EU requirements,
actual transposition of the requirements must occur. This is
done by either adopting new legislation or modifying existing
legislation to achieve the requirements of the environmental
acquis.58 Applicants must do more than merely copy the text of
the EU requirements into their national legislation. Existing
environmental legislation, as well as the administrative
capabilities of the government should be taken into account
when transposing the requirements of the environmental acquis.
It may be necessary to create new administrative structures or
modify and enhance the environmental standards within the
country, in order to successfully transpose the acquis.59
Applicant countries have begun the process of
approximating their legislation to the requirements of the acquis.
So far, transposing the requirements into the applicants’ national
legislation has been the area where the most progress has
occurred.
2. Implementation
While the applicant countries have started to transpose
the requirements of the environmental acquis into their national
legislation, the approximation process is far from complete.
Transposing the requirements is actually the easy part of the
approximation process. National legislatures can easily adopt
the requirements of the acquis % just ratifying a piece of paper.
The applicants still need to implement and enforce the
legislation that is transposed into national law.60 Achieving
progress in these portions of approximation has proven to be
much more difficult for the applicant countries.61
Implementation is the process of having the national
authorities that are in charge of the environment take EU
environmental requirements into account when making
individual decisions.62 The European Union believes that
implementation of the environmental requirements will provide
the applicant countries with significant benefits.63 Because of
this, the EU is requiring that the provisions of the environmental
acquis be clearly implemented by the applicants. The failure to
clearly implement the requirements or a delay in doing so may
result in delays to the accession process.64 The possibility of a
delay in accession resulting from the failure to successfully
implement the environmental acquis serves to signify the
importance that the environment has in the
approximation process.
Applicant countries will have to make improvements
in many areas in order for successful implementation to occur.
Among the necessary improvements are the creation of reliable
data collection systems, effective systems of monitoring and
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

reporting, increasing the awareness of industry and the public
in environmental matters, and facilitation of public participation
in environmental issues. 65 Perhaps the most pressing
requirement for the applicant states, in order to successfully
implement the environmental acquis, is the development of
competent national authorities to carry out environmental
administration.
European Union legislation often does not specify who
is responsible for ensuring compliance with the law’s
requirements. Typically, compliance is left to the discretion of
the member states, or in this case the applicant countries. It is
often done at the local or regional level of government.66
Therefore, it is necessary that the applicant countries have an
administrative structure capable of ensuring compliance with
the requirements of the acquis. The EU expects that member
states will have administrative agencies possessing an adequate
capacity to implement and enforce EU law.67 Unfortunately,
this does not exist in most of the applicant countries. Many
applicant countries lack the qualified personnel necessary to
implement and enforce the environmental acquis.68 These tasks
belong to several different administrative agencies in some
applicant countries, resulting in a lack of coordination in
ensuring compliance. 69 The result is that significant
improvement in administration is required in most applicant
countries. Without improvement, implementation and
enforcement of the acquis will be impossible.
Due to financial constraints and the amount of
improvement that is necessary, applicant countries have
requested transition periods from the EU in order to comply
with the environmental acquis.70 However, the Commission
insists that the acquis should be complied with as soon as
possible. For the most part, requests for transition periods
have been viewed as “totally unacceptable.”71 Transition periods
may be granted for some elements of the acquis – those that
require significant investments.72
3. Enforcement
The adoption and implementation of the
environmental acquis by applicant countries does not ensure
that these measures will be adequately enforced. Enforcement
is the use of measures that encourage or compel others to
comply with government legislation.73 The environmental acquis
contains the environmental standards that EU members must
satisfy. Enforcement of these standards is then left to the
member states.74 Enforcement is subject to many of the same
problems, especially administratively, that plague
implementation.
Enforcement of EU environmental legislation is often
based on self-monitoring.75 Self-monitoring allows individuals
within the country to monitor compliance with environmental
regulations. Should a violation occur, an individual engaged in
self-monitoring is expected to report the violation to the
responsible authority. The EU views self-monitoring as the
ideal mechanism for enforcement. This is because it passes
the costs of monitoring to the individual and it satisfies the
polluter pays principle.76 For a self-monitoring system of
enforcement to prove effective, violations of the law must be
reported and the results must be seen as trustworthy.77
Even if a self-monitoring system of enforcement is
followed, inspections should still be conducted as part of the
SPRING / SUMMER 2002

enforcement process. Inspections conducted on the basis of
information supplied through self-monitoring ensures that
environmental requirements are being complied with. 78
Inspections can be as simple as a walk through of an area to a
full inspection of the area. The criteria used for an inspection
have been established through an EU recommendation.79 While
additional administrative personnel are necessary to adequately
enforce environmental requirements, most applicant countries
are seen as having “reasonable inspection procedures.”80
Enforcement also requires that appropriate penalties
be established for violations of environmental legislation.
Penalties should serve to punish for violations of environmental
legislation that do occur, while at the same time serving as a
deterrent against future violations. Violations are punished by
fines in most countries. Unfortunately, fines do not always
serve as adequate punishment or provide effective deterrence
against future violations. They are often included in the costs
of operation by many individuals.81 More effective penalties,
such as heavy fines or criminal prosecution, are not frequently
used.82
Applicant countries need to ensure that enforcement
of environmental legislation is carried out. Self-monitoring
may be appropriate as long as it is conducted in conjunction
with periodic inspections. A system of penalties for failure to
comply with environmental legislation also needs to be
established. This system must adequately punish violators and
deter individuals from committing further violations.
COSTS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE ENVIRONMENTAL ACQUIS
Accession to the European Union has been made
conditional on compliance with the environmental acquis by
the applicant countries. The applicant countries must adopt,
implement and enforce the provisions of EU legislation.
Currently, environmental standards within the applicant
countries require significant improvement in order to meet the
standards set forth in the environmental acquis. The applicant
countries are also expected to comply with the requirements
of the acquis as soon as possible. Complete compliance with
the environmental acquis by the applicant countries, as the EU
desires before accession can occur, will be difficult to achieve.
This is due to the significant amounts of financial resources
compliance with the environmental acquis requires.83
Predictions of the costs of complying with the
environmental acquis vary depending on the factors that are
taken into consideration. Typically, three factors must be known
in order for an estimate to be made. These are the total amount
of pollution, the amount of pollution that must be reduced,
and the amount that it costs to reduce a specified unit of
pollution based on different reduction techniques.84 Taking
these factors into account, estimates of the costs of compliance
have been made. These estimates have determined that it will
cost the ten applicant countries located in Central and Eastern
Europe approximately eighty to one hundred-twenty billion
euros to satisfy the requirements of the environmental acquis.85
These estimates include cost estimates for both the public and
private sector. Cost estimates appear to be significantly higher
in the private sector. Due to this fact, the EU suggests that all
new project development that occurs within the applicant
countries before they accede should comply with the
environmental acquis.86 This is because it is more costly to
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retrofit an existing structure than it is to include the technology
when the structure is initially constructed.
Approximation of the acquis is most costly in the areas
of air pollution, water and wastewater management, and solid
waste management.87 Setting up the administrative structure
necessary to carry out the environmental acquis is also very
expensive.88 Full compliance with the acquis’ requirements for
water and wastewater is estimated to cost roughly fifty billion
euros.89 The cost of complying with the requirements for air
pollution is estimated at 1.4 percent of a country’s gross
domestic product.90 In an effort to minimize the expense as
much as possible, the applicant countries should seek to identify
the most cost efficient methods available to meet the
requirements of the acquis.
Obtaining the resources necessary to successfully
approximate the environmental acquis, while at the same time,
attempting to satisfy the other chapters of the acquis will prove
to be extremely difficult for the applicant countries. It is made
even more difficult by the fact that there is only limited funding
available. The EU has established some programs (which will
be discussed below) to assist the applicant countries in
complying with the acquis. However, the applicant countries
are expected to mobilize the majority of the necessary resources
on their own.91 Thus, the applicant countries face a significant
challenge.
BENEFITS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE ENVIRONMENTAL ACQUIS
While compliance with the environmental acquis may
require significant investment on the part of the applicant
countries, they also stand to receive significant benefits as a
result of raising their environmental standards. Determining
the impact of compliance with environmental legislation is
difficult. However, it is anticipated that the benefits to the
applicant countries will at least equal the costs, in monetary
terms. Compliance with the acquis will result in improved health
and quality of life throughout the European Union.92 The
applicant countries that should benefit the most from
compliance with the acquis are Poland, Turkey, Romania, and
the Czech Republic.93
Assuming that the applicant countries comply with the
acquis, it is anticipated that they will receive benefits ranging
between 134 billion and 681 billion euros through the year
2020.94 These benefits will range from better public health to
increased tourism. Benefits will occur in areas covered by the
water, air and waste directives.95 The ecosystem will also realize
benefits. Half of the total benefits result from reduced air
pollution. It is expected that between 15,000 and 34,000
premature deaths will be prevented and that up to 180,000
cases of chronic bronchitis will be avoided, through
implementation of the air directives alone.96
FUNDING MECHANISMS AVAILABLE TO THE APPLICANT COUNTRIES
The European Commission proposed “Agenda 2000”
to the Parliament in 1997. Agenda 2000 contained the
Commission’s opinions on how enlargement to the Central and
Eastern European countries should be conducted.97 It called
for the creation of accession partnerships between current EU
members and the applicant countries. This program recognized
that full compliance with the environmental acquis by the
applicant countries can only be achieved in the long term. It
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recommended that realistic strategies for approximation are
established and that implementation should begin in all of the
applicant countries.98
Agenda 2000 also recognized that approximation
would require significant financial resources. Recognizing that
the EU could not meet the costs of approximation, this program
contained proposals for other methods of financial assistance.
Among the recommended programs were the Instrument for
Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (“ISPA”) and PHARE.99
The amount of aid available to the applicant countries through
these programs is approximately twenty-two billion euros.100
The EU wants the applicants to use these resources as a catalyst
in the implementation of the acquis.101 Once a country becomes
a member of the EU, it will lose any assistance from these
programs, and the money will be redistributed admitted to the
Union.102
1. PHARE Program
The PHARE program is a financial assistance program
that is used by the EU to help the applicant countries implement
the accession partnerships. PHARE consists of roughly eleven
billion euros.103 These funds are to be used for institution
building and acquis related investments. Approximately 30
percent of the funding go towards institution building – the
strengthening of institutions that implement and enforce the
EU legislation. The remaining 70 percent of funds go towards
strengthening regulatory infrastructure and investments in
economic and social cohesion.104 In the environmental area,
programs financed under PHARE helps address immediate
environmental problems in the applicant countries.105
2. ISPA
ISPA is a program created by the Commission to
provide funding for improvements in environmental and
transport infrastructure. It will provide partial funding for the
large environmental projects that are necessary in the applicant
countries prior to accession. It will also help the applicants’ to
align their infrastructure standards with those of the acquis.106
ISPA encourages the applicant countries to obtain private
funding for projects. The amount of funding that it provides
is relatively small, compared to the total costs that these projects
require. Up to seventy-five percent of the public funding can
be provided to the applicant countries under ISPA. One
hundred percent of the cost of preliminary studies will be
covered under the program.107
3. Structural and Cohesion Funds
A third possible source of financing exists for the
applicant countries; however, they will not have access to it
until they become members of the Union. These are the
Structural and Cohesion Funds. These funds comprise
approximately 80 percent of the EU’s budget.108 They provide
financial assistance to the EU’s poorest member states. The
goal is to reduce the economic and social disparities that exist
in different regions of the EU. Resources from the Cohesion
Fund are available to regions that have a per capita gross
domestic product of less than ninety percent of the EU average.
Structural Funds are available to regions that have a per capita
GDP of less than seventy-five percent the EU average.109
The EU has not decided how these funds will operate
upon accession of the applicant countries. Many current
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member states do not want to lose the funds they presently
receive and are therefore objecting to any modifications. The
applicant countries have per capita GDP’s that are significantly
lower than those of the existing members. If the criteria for
receiving funds from these programs are not altered, the majority
of funding would go to the new members.110 However, it
appears unlikely that this will occur, at least in the immediate
future. The Commission has proposed a plan that would limit
the amount of funding that the new member states could receive
from these programs to four percent of the national GDP.111
CONCLUSION
The European Union has entered into a period of
enlargement. The candidate countries come from Central and
Eastern Europe, in addition to Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus. The
EU insists that the applicant countries approximate their
legislation to include the entire acquis communautaire prior to
accession into the Union. One of the chapters of the acquis
that the applicant countries must satisfy is the environmental
one. Compliance with this chapter of the acquis will be difficult
for the applicant countries to achieve prior to accession. It
may be necessary to provide the applicants’ with a limited
transition period to approximate some of the requirements.
The applicant countries need to make improvements to the
administrative agencies that will be responsible for
implementing and enforcing the EU legislation. They also need
to train employees to staff the agencies. Furthermore, the
applicant countries are lacking the significant amounts of
financial resources that are necessary to successfully
approximate the environmental acquis. It has been left to the
applicants to obtain the funding that is necessary – the EU is
only provided limited assistance that is intended to serve as a
catalyst in the approximation process. Due to the applicant
countries desire to accede to the EU, it will only be a matter of
time before they achieve full compliance with the environmental
acquis. The result will be that the applicant countries gain access
to a major economic market and the EU will receive a cleaner
and healthier environment to live in.112
The term applicant countries will be used throughout this paper
for consistency. After negotiations have begun with the applicant
countries, they are considered to be candidate countries.
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